The term “dignity of living beings” emerged for the first time in 1789, namely in a work of the Danish philosopher and pastor Lauritz Smith. In “Über die Natur und Bestimmung der Thiere wie auch von den Pflichten der Menschen gegen die Thiere”,  he writes: “Every living being, every animal exists first and immediately for its own, and to enjoy beatitude through its existence” (unofficial translation).

The ability to sense happiness constitutes the claim for justice and dignity. Smith’s concept of dignity does, however, have two sides. On the one hand, the animal’s dignity draws from it being a being that can be made happy. On the other hand, it is based in it having significance for the whole, which means being a benefit for other animals or the human being. This idea can also be found in the Swiss legislation in the demanded balancing of legally protected interests between the interests of the animals and those of the human being.

Basel’s theologist Karl Barth also shaped the concept in his ecclesiastic dogmatics 1945, under the influence of Albert Schweizer’s “The Ethics of Reverence for Life” and after having intensively turned to the Biblical creation account (Genesis 1). Barth spoke of a dignity for all living creatures by means of them having been created by God. For Barth, a criterion for dignity is the ability to proper motion, which reaches its maximum in human autonomy. Since plants are also capable of proper motion, he ascribes dignity to plants as well. The human being is ascribed most dignity but at the same time s/he is also given more responsibility toward the other living beings.