Identity Argument
The identity argument states that a living creature is at all points in its development identical to the living creature that it was at an earlier point in time. In other words, over time a human being, for example, remains the same as what he or she was as an embryo. According to this argument, the dignity of a person cannot be added at a later point in time but must be recognised from the beginning of the individual's existence.
Cf. on the so-called ‘sortal’ concept of identity, for example:
Geach, P. T. (1962). Reference and Generality. An examination of some medieval and modern theories. Cornell University Press.
Merkel, R. (2001). Früheuthanasie. Rechtsethische und strafrechtliche Grundlagen ärztlicher Entscheidungen über Leben und Tod in der Neonatalenmedizin. Nomos.
Wiggins, D. (1967). Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. Oxford University Press.
Arguments in favour of recognising the identity argument can be found, for example, in:
Enskat, R. (2002). Pro Identitätsargument: Auch menschliche Embryonen sind jederzeit Menschen. In G. Damschen & D. Schönecker (Eds.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen. De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110899795
Stegmüller, W. (1970). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Bd. 2: Theorie und Erfahrung. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61671-6
Arguments against recognising the identity argument can be found, for example, in:
Singer, P. (1980). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Stoecker, R. (2002). Contra Identitätsargument. Mein Embryo und ich. In G. Damschen & D. Schönecker (Eds.), Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen. De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110899795
Lee, P. (2004). The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence. Bioethics, 18(3), 249–263. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00393.x
For a critical discussion, cf:
Birnbacher, D. (1995). Gefährdet die moderne Reproduktionsmedizin die menschliche Würde? In A. Leist (Ed.), Um Leben und Tod. Moralische Probleme bei Abtreibung, künstlicher Befruchtung, Euthanasie und Selbstmord. Suhrkamp.
Cf. for an overview of the debate:
Damschen, G., & Schönecker, D. (2003). (Eds.). Der moralische Status menschlicher Embryonen: Pro und contra Spezies-, Kontinuums-, Identitäts- und Potentialitätsargument. De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110899795
More Positions can be found in:
Geach, P. (1962). Reference and Generality. Cornell.
Wiggins, D. (1967). Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. Oxford.
Lee, P. (2004). The Pro-Life Argument from Substantial Identity: A Defence. Bioethics, 18(3), 249–263. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2004.00393.x
Singer, P. (1980). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Brock, D. W. (2006). Is a consensus possible on stem cell research? Moral and political obstacles. Journal of Medical Ethics, 32(1), 36–42. http://doi.org/10.1136/jme.2005.013581
Strong, C. (2006). Preembryo Personhood: An Assessment of the President’s Council Arguments. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 27(5), 433–453. http://doi.org/10.1007/s11017-006-9016-7
Mauron, A., & Baertschi, B. (2004). The European Embryonic Stem-Cell Debate and the Difficulties of Embryological Kantianism. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, 29(5), 563–581. http://doi.org/10.1080/03605310490514234